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Committed to Peace: The Potential of Former FARC-EP Midlevel Commanders as Local Leaders in the Peace Process

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Civil War
Paths

About the Researcher

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About the Research

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The results presented here are based on interviews with former FARC-EP midlevel commanders and policymakers, practitioners and experts in national agencies, international organisations, universities and think tanks and an extensive review of documents, reports, academic literature and news sources. All interviews are anonymised in line with the University Ethics Review (Reference Number 030552).

The views presented in this brief are those of the author and not necessarily those of the University of Sheffield or the organisations that enabled this research.

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Preface

It is a pleasure and an honour to write this short preface to Anastasia Shesterinina's first SPERI Policy Brief, *Committed to Peace: The Potential of Former FARC-EP Midlevel Commanders as Local Leaders in the Peace Process*. It will surely not be her last. Indeed, SPERI is looking forward to working closely with Anastasia and her colleagues in the new Centre for the Comparative Study of Civil War that she will establish; this we see as just the start of that exciting partnership. I would also like to take the opportunity of this preface to congratulate Anastasia on the award of a prestigious UK Research and Innovation Future Leaders Fellowship, which will allow her to study different paths that civil wars follow from pre- to post-war stages and advance practices to sustain peace in conflict affected societies.

Drawing on extensive field research conducted between 2018 and 2020, this policy brief challenges conventional understanding of peacebuilding in Colombia. In particular, it recasts our understanding of the potential role of former midlevel commanders of the FARC-EP. Whilst they have typically been cast as "spoilers," the policy brief identifies a series of key leadership roles that such actors have come to play and might continue to play in the peace agreement negotiations, disarmament, reincorporation and formal and informal peacebuilding efforts. It attributes this crucial role to the skills, status and understanding of the territory that they developed during the war. In the process it clarifies the category of "midlevel commander" in the organisation of the FARC-EP. It recommends that national and international actors consult former FARC-EP midlevel commanders, drawing on their knowledge of the local dynamics of armed conflict and violence, the conditions in ex-combatant communities and the organisation of armed groups to advance the peace process in the areas of security, development and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.

This is a crucial and timely message and SPERI is excited and delighted to have the opportunity to help disseminate it to both national and international actors involved in the peace process.

Colin Hay, Professor of Political Analysis and Director, SPERI

Summary

Midlevel commanders of armed groups are characterised as “spoilers” of peace, but they can also play important roles in advancing peace. This brief offers insights into the skills and standing that midlevel commanders develop during war and their leadership in negotiations, disarmament, reincorporation and formal and informal peacebuilding efforts. It shows the potential of midlevel commanders as local leaders and calls for reconceptualising this key actor as an important resource rather than an obstacle in the Colombian peace process, drawing recommendations for national and international actors.

Midlevel Commanders and the Potential for Peace

Midlevel commanders of armed groups engaged in peace processes are often viewed as “spoilers” of peace who can “use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it”ⁱ or as intermediaries between the “spoiler” elite and ex-combatants who are able to mobilise their former rank-and-file subordinates for elite-orchestrated violence.ⁱⁱ This is because during war midlevel commanders occupy a critical space at the center of hierarchical armed groups. They “facilitat[e] the flow of information, resources, skills, and strategic direction between the top and the bottom of the organization.”ⁱⁱⁱ They also develop the knowledge of the territory and the population that is essential for its operations.^{iv} As a result, midlevel commanders acquire military, economic and social power and status among both fighters and local communities. They might then “feel that they are not adequately compensated in peace settlements” negotiated by top commanders to secure own interests and designed for rank-and-file combatants.^v

In Colombia, midlevel commanders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC-EP), referred to as “mandos medios” (the middle managers) in Spanish, have thus been frequently described as “spoilers” in the process of implementation of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace signed by the National Government and the FARC-EP in 2016. Academics have emphasized “the need to consider... their role in ‘rearmament.’”^{vi} Think tanks have called for the development of special programmes for midlevel commanders to prevent their return to violence.^{vii} Media reports have focused on midlevel commanders who have abandoned the peace process during and after the negotiations and formed or joined dissident groups to continue engaging in violent activities, including lucrative drug trade and illegal mining.^{viii} Observers have noted that their extensive skills as “specialists in violence” have become an attractive asset to active armed groups.^{ix}

This characterisation of former FARC-EP midlevel commanders as “spoilers” of peace is based on the history of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) efforts in Colombia, particularly in relation to the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC),^x and a relatively small number of highly publicised recent cases, including five commanders who were expelled from the FARC-EP for rejecting the peace process in December 2016^{xi} and 11 who withdrew from the peace process together with Iván Márquez and Jesús Santrich in August 2019.^{xii, xiii} Most former FARC-EP midlevel commanders, however, appear to remain in the process among the 13,511 former FARC-EP members accredited by the High Commissioner for Peace and to be committed to peace.^{xiv, xv} My interviews support this observation. “There exists this possibility [of rearmament]. But there are also benefits in the peace process. Most do not want to rearm and want to stay,” officials of the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation (ARN) say.^{xvi} Analysts at La Fundación Ideas para la Paz confirm that “there are few who had rearmed.”^{xvii} “We are very committed,” a former FARC-EP midlevel commander from Arauca Department captures this group’s stated commitment to peace.^{xviii}

Moreover, former FARC-EP midlevel commanders have played a range of leadership roles during the negotiations and since the signing of the peace agreement, particularly at the local level, establishing their potential as **local leaders in the peace process**. This “positive impact on peace” was previously shown in Liberia, the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, among other cases, where former midlevel commanders used the skills and standing that they developed during war to promote demilitarisation of their units, engage their former rank-and-file subordinates in businesses and joint enterprises and participate in peace institutions, thereby “becoming agents of peace rather than agents of war.”^{xxix} Yet this potential is rarely advanced in peace processes that seek to dismantle ranked hierarchies. The Final Agreement with the FARC-EP indeed refers to rank only in relation to command responsibility^{xxx} and interviewees agree that “the government does not have a strategy for midlevel commanders.”^{xxxi}

The following sections outline the position that former midlevel commanders occupied in the FARC-EP armed structure and the local leadership roles they have undertaken in the peace process, including during the COVID-19 pandemic. The findings point to the need to shift the negative perceptions of these actors and enable their local leadership as one way forward in supporting peace in Colombia.

Midlevel Commanders in the FARC-EP

According to both experts and former midlevel commanders, the category of “midlevel commander” is a “grey zone” in the FARC-EP; “Some ex-FARC members tell, ‘Not even in our statutes do we have it.’”^{xxii} As a former midlevel commander explains, “in the FARC, there are only two categories, base guerrillas and commanders. There is no proper category defined as ‘midlevel.’”^{xxiii} The FARC-EP Statute includes commanders and deputies of Squads, Guerrillas, Companies, Columns, Fronts, Blocks and Central High Command in the hierarchical structure of the organisation and uses the language of “responsibility” rather than level of command.^{xxiv} However, general command of the organisation falls on commanders of Blocks and Central High Command, some of whom are part of the highest organ the Secretariat, distinguishing these top commanders from “mandos medios” who “represent the transmission belt between those who make strategic decisions and fighters who execute and set them in motion.”^{xxv}

Former midlevel commanders I interviewed associate this category with commanders and deputies of intermediate structures from Squads to Fronts and define it first and foremost by the responsibility for others that it entails and the skills and standing required to perform it. While there exists variation in the paths that midlevel commanders follow, a typical trajectory of a midlevel commander starts with at least two years of training that includes basic skills such as reading and writing and political-military courses, observing the FARC-EP regulations and successfully performing assigned tasks.^{xxvi} Those who demonstrate the capacity for leadership and trustworthiness through their behavior during this period can progress to “mando medio” roles, starting with deputy of a Squad, the unit consisting of 12 people. Those who are sanctioned for not respecting the rules of the organisation during this period, including in terms of their conduct with the population, other combatants and superiors, rarely progress.^{xxvii}

Once in the role, “mandos medios” are responsible for “regulating the life of the unit” by ensuring that combatants under their command have access to basic necessities such as food and clothes, educating them, maintaining discipline and assigning tasks.^{xxviii} Enlisting in the FARC-EP is “a lifelong commitment. Recruits do not have the right to leave... Family contacts are reduced to a minimum.”^{xxix} The midlevel commander who is the closest point of authority in the unit—“top level commanders do not interact with rank-and-file”—thus becomes a father or mother figure for combatants and

addresses their daily problems, resolves conflicts and offers advice.^{xxx} She is also responsible for controlling the territory, working with the population and securing cash flows for the organisation.^{xxxi} This means that “midlevel commanders certainly have more influence over the base and even over the communities,” an expert in armed conflict dynamics and DDR concludes.^{xxxii}

This influence can be a challenge for DDR and transitional justice efforts. As a national security expert explains, “the step to becoming normal people is very hard for [midlevel commanders] because of the change in power. They have or had a lot of power [over the] organisation, people, money and for that reason they prefer to try and continue in an illegal way.”^{xxxiii} This sets midlevel commanders apart from top commanders whose interests are represented in the negotiations and rank-and-file combatants who are at the core of DDR programmes. “It is always one of the major problems in the demobilisation process because nothing is suitable for them,” ARN officials corroborate, and add that “these people were really in charge... They are not the main [actor] responsible because they were in the middle but sometimes they were the people who said, ‘Let’s do this or that.’ At the political, judicial level, it is also a problem,” especially in the context of efforts toward truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition.^{xxxiv} This influence, however, can also be an **important resource in the peace process**.

Midlevel Commanders as Local Leaders in the Peace Process

Former FARC-EP midlevel commanders have used their skills and standing within the organisation and among the population to advance the peace process during the negotiations and since the signing of the peace agreement in at least five ways. First, during the negotiations, they played an essential role of **communicating decisions made in Havana** to fighters and communities. As one interviewee states,

I raised the unit at 5am to study the Agreement with the group. What was going on in Havana was coming to us point by point as study material. So when the proposals for comprehensive rural reform arrived, that was the study material. When the first point was approved, that was the topic of pedagogy, not only with the boys, but also in meetings with the community.^{xxxv}

In this process, midlevel commanders explained the contents of the agreement, discussed its pros and cons and worked to convince their subordinates of its importance and diminish their doubts and fears.

Second, after the agreement was signed in 2016, former midlevel commanders were key in **facilitating the disarmament of their units**, as commanders responsible for their units and as part of the tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mechanism. A former midlevel commander demonstrates this role:

The term “the laying down of arms” was very difficult for the whole guerrilla base of the FARC ... because weapons for us were, they were life. And it was up to us [midlevel commanders] to begin [the process], those of us who had the most understanding to say what “the laying down of arms” meant, what its role was, and [we] implemented the process through subordination.^{xxxvi}

All former commanders I interviewed stressed that their units disarmed in full in rural zones and points for transitional normalisation established for disarmament^{xxxvii} and underlined their role in the process.

Third, many former FARC-EP midlevel commanders have been central in **organising life and mobilising productive projects** in former territorial spaces for training and reincorporation (ETCRs) established in 2017 and new reincorporation areas (NARs) that ex-combatants have formed. While new leaders have emerged in the course of transitioning to civilian life, including through internal conflicts between former FARC-EP members, and the figure of midlevel commander has dissipated over time, international organisation staff corroborate that

The leaders of ETCRs, most of them are [former] middle rank members of the guerrilla. These people are still in charge of many things. They were in charge back in the war. They have this power and they know how to lead people.^{xxxviii}

This leadership has been demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic. As representatives of former ETCRs and NARs, often elected by their communities, former midlevel commanders helped overcome the uncertainty of the outbreak of the pandemic in early 2020. They sought information on the events, explained the situation to community members and developed collective responses to limit the spread of the virus and assist those in need.^{xxxix} The productive projects that they lead have been a source of survival in these dire conditions in many ex-combatant communities.

Former FARC-EP midlevel commanders have also held formal roles as local links in the peace process by **participating in dialogue and monitoring institutions** such as the Tripartite Security and Protection Mechanism (ITPS) that focuses on security and protection of former FARC-EP members. “As part of the ITPS, I am at the forefront of the issue of security and protection,” a former midlevel commander from Chocó Department explains, “I am a FARC liaison with the UN.”^x Such “[l]ocal FARC focal points,” the United Nations Secretary-General reports, “are playing a significant role in enhancing understanding of and ensuring adequate institutional responses to local security challenges.”^{xi} Despite internal divisions within the FARC-EP political party, these actors thus remain “the transmission belt” between national, regional and local levels in those institutions where they represent the party and their communities.

Finally, former FARC-EP midlevel commanders have been active in **leading peace initiatives** outside of the formal mechanisms established by the peace process. For example, the interviewee from Chocó Department launched “a platform for peace and reconciliation” through sport, with “sports training schools in conflict-affected areas [contributing to] the creation of peace in the territories. That’s what I’ve dedicated myself to, that’s investment in the area,” he says explaining how this initiative advances the notion of “territorial peace,” which centers on rural development.^{xii} Others have repurposed their wartime expertise for the advancement of peace. One former midlevel commander who specialised in cartography demonstrates with the organisation that he created to observe and produce knowledge on territorial dynamics of violence, including maps, and devise community protection measures.^{xiii}

Overall, former FARC-EP midlevel commanders stress that through this leadership they are “playing a very important role of communicating the FARC’s commitment to the Agreement.”^{xiv} They do not view themselves as “mandos medios” because the wartime command hierarchy no longer exists, but rather as leaders in their communities and in the peace process. Due to their ongoing ties with ex-combatants and knowledge of the territories, this leadership is first and foremost local. “I do not want to leave my territory... I am most passionate about the community,” a leader of a number of initiatives in a former ETCR in Cesar Department illustrates, reflecting this group’s potential as local leaders.^{xv}

Actions for National and International Actors in the Peace Process

National and international actors involved in the peace process should use this potential as a resource in the context of ongoing armed conflict, “epidemic of violence” against social leaders and FARC-EP ex-combatants,^{xli} slow implementation of the agreement^{xlvii} and the COVID-19 pandemic in three ways:

- Consult former FARC-EP midlevel commanders’ knowledge of the local dynamics of armed conflict and violence and provide support for community security initiatives to enhance understanding of and develop adequate responses to local **security** challenges, including community strategies.
- Consult former FARC-EP midlevel commanders’ knowledge of the local conditions in the former ETCRs, NARs and other localities where ex-combatants live collectively to provide adequate short-term support during the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in light of limited local access created by the national quarantine measures, and incorporate local needs into long-term **development** plans.
- Consult former FARC-EP midlevel commanders’ knowledge of the organisation of armed groups and provide support for local reincorporation/reconciliation initiatives to enhance understanding of armed group recruitment and advance **DDR** efforts, including prevention of rearmament.

These benefits will require a shift in the negative perceptions of these actors as “spoilers” of peace. They will also require particular attention to the protection of these actors from threats and attacks by existing armed groups, including dissidents of the FARC-EP, to reflect the realities of what an expert in organised crime, conflict and security calls “the double stigmatisation” that these actors face.^{xlix}

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- ⁱⁱ Midlevel commanders' intermediary role is observed in Liberia, the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, among other cases (Anders Themnér (2011) *Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilizers and Relationships*, London: Routledge).
- ⁱⁱⁱ Peter Neumann, Ryan Evans and Raffaello Pantucci (2011) "Locating Al Qaeda's Center of Gravity: The Role of Middle Managers," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34 (11): 829.
- ^{iv} Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2005) "Siguiendo el conflicto: hechos y análisis de la semana," *Número 26*, p. 3 <http://archive.ideaspaz.org/images/boletin_conflicto26.pdf>.
- ^v Patrick Johnston (2008) "The Geography of Insurgent Organization and its Consequences for Civil Wars: Evidence from Liberia and Sierra Leone," *Security Studies* 17 (1): 137. See also Kimberly Theidon (2016) "Peace in Colombia: A Time to Believe?" *Current History* 115 (778): 54.
- ^{vi} Theidon (2016: 54).
- ^{vii} Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2010) "Mandos medios de las FARC y su proceso de desmovilización en el conflicto colombiano: ¿una apuesta para la paz o para la Guerra?" *Informe n° 10* <<http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/81>>; Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2018) "Trayectorias y dinámicas territoriales de las disidencias de las FARC," *Informe n° 30* <http://ideaspaz.org/media/website/FIP_Disidencias_Final.pdf>.
- ^{viii} See, for example, "El peligroso olvido de los mandos medios," *La Silla*, 22 Dec 2016 <<https://lasillavacia.com/historia/el-peligroso-olvido-de-los-mandos-medios-59242>>; "Mandos medios: amenaza mortal a la paz," *El Colombiano*, 30 Jan 2017 <<http://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/paz-y-derechos-humanos/mandos-medios-amenazamortal-a-la-paz-FK5837315>>; "Who are leading the FARC dissident groups and where," *Colombia Reports*, 3 Mar 2018 <<https://colombiareports.com/leading-farc-dissident-groups/>>; "El anuncio de Iván Márquez y las 'nuevas' FARC: implicaciones y posibles impactos," *Noticias FIP*, 30 Aug 2019 <<http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1782>>. For analysis, see Camilo González Posso et al. (2020) "Los Grupos PosFARC-EP: Un Escenario Complejo," *Indepaz* <<http://www.indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/PRESENCIA-DE-DISIDENCIAS-ABRIL.pdf>>. For further discussion, see "La división de las Farc, las disidencias y la guerra por los territorios," *El Espectador*, 15 Nov 2020 <<https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/la-division-de-las-farc-las-disidencias-y-la-guerra-por-los-territorios/>>.

^{ix} Charles Tilly (2003) *The Politics of Collective Violence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 35. Interview 3, International Organisation for Migration, 21 May 2018; Interview 8, Universidad de los Andes, 22 May 2019; Interview 11, Office of the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations in Colombia, 21 May 2019; Interview 14, Universidad de los Andes, 3 Feb 2020.

^x See, for example, Kimberly Theidon (2007) "Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia," *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 1 (1): 66-90; Enzo Nussio (2009) "¿Reincidir o no? Conceptos de la literatura internacional aplicados al caso de desarme, desmovilización y reintegración de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia," *Pensamiento Jurídico* 26: 213-235; Themnér (2011: 159); Nussio and Howe (2016). For a detailed comparison of post-war trajectories of 37 militias in Colombia, see Sarah Zukerman Daly (2016) *Organized Violence after Civil War: The Geography of Recruitment in Latin America*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

^{xi} "Splits form among Colombia's Farc rebels after commanders expelled," *The Guardian*, 14 Dec 2016 <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/14/colombia-farc-commanders-expelled>>. Some of those expelled, particularly Gentil Duarte, were top commanders. For a discussion, see Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2018). This was the second group to oppose the peace process. On the first group, the Armando Rios First Front, see, for example, "Colombian Farc rebel unit rejects peace deal, saying it will not disarm," *The Guardian*, 7 Jul 2016 <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/07/colombian-farc-rebel-unit-not-disarm-under-peace-deal>>.

^{xii} Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (2019) "Más sombras que luces, un análisis de seguridad en Colombia," p. 3 <https://pares.com.co/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/SEGURIDAD-DUQUE_2019.pdf>. See also "Who the former FARC members of the new dissident group are," *Colombia Reports*, 30 Aug 2019 <<https://colombiareports.com/who-the-former-farc-members-of-the-new-dissident-group-are/>>.

^{xiii} While the total number of midlevel commanders at the time of the negotiations is difficult to establish as this data is not readily available, Ariel Ávila, Deputy Director of La Fundación Paz y Reconciliación, estimated 700 in 2016 ("Los mandos medios," *Semana*, 20 Jul 2016 <<https://www.semana.com/opinion/articulo/los-mandos-medios-opinion-de-ariel-avila/482721/>>). Lower estimates suggest there are 340 former midlevel commanders over 48 years old, but likely exclude younger midlevel commanders and those occupying lower posts on the organisational hierarchy, such as deputy of a Squad, which is a unit consisting of 12 people ("¿Y después de las armas qué?" *Semana*, 30 Sep 2017 <<https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/mandos-medios-de-las-farc-sobre-la-incertidumbre/542106/>>).

^{xiv} "ARN in Numbers," *Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation*, Jul 2020, p. 6 <[http://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/en/agency/ARN%20Process%20Figures/ARN in Numbers July 2020.pdf](http://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/en/agency/ARN%20Process%20Figures/ARN%20in%20Numbers%20July%202020.pdf)>.

^{xv} Estimates of the total number of former FARC-EP members in dissident groups vary, with Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (2019: 3) estimating 1,800. Higher estimates of the number of dissident group members typically include new recruits with no prior membership in the FARC-EP (see, for example, Posso et al., 2020: 11).

^{xvi} Interview 5, ARN, 21 May 2018.

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^{xviii} Former FARC-EP midlevel commander interview 7, 5 Feb 2020.

- ^{xx} Themnér (2011: 165, 167). See also, for example, Natasha Lemasle (2010) *Combatants' Disarmament: Do Command and Control Matter? A Comparison of Sierra Leone and Liberia*. PhD dissertation, Northwestern University; Anders Themnér (2012) "Former Mid-Level Commanders in Big Man Networks," in *African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks*, edited by Mats Utas, London: Zed Books, p. 219; Joanne Richards (2012) "DDR in DRC: The Impact of Command and Control," Geneva Institute of International and Development Studies, United Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace <<https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/files/case-study-competition/20130322-DDR-in-DRC.pdf>>.
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- ^{xxiii} Interview 16, United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, 16 Feb 2020. See also Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2005: 1).
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- ^{xxv} FARC-EP Statute (1993) Eighth FARC-EP Conference, Chapter III, Article 4a-n, p. 11. See also Observatorio de procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración (2009) "La reintegración de mandos medios de las FARC-EP," Universidad Nacional de Colombia, p. 7 <http://www.humanas.unal.edu.co/observapazyconflicto/files/1214/3594/1606/ODDR_Mandos_medios_ASDI_2010.pdf>.
- ^{xxvi} Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2010: 8), translated from Spanish. See also Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2005).
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- ^{xxviii} FARC-EP Statute (1993) *Regulation of the Disciplinary Regime*, Chapter I, Article 1, pp. 26-7.
- ^{xxix} Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2005: 3), translated from Spanish.
- ^{xxx} Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín (2008) "Telling the Difference: Guerrillas and Paramilitaries in the Colombian War," *Politics & Society* 36 (1): 17.
- ^{xxxi} Interview 16, United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, 16 Feb 2020.
- ^{xxxii} Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2005: 3-4).
- ^{xxxiii} Interview 16, United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, 16 Feb 2020.
- ^{xxxiv} Interview 18, Administrative Department of the Presidency of the Republic, 7 Feb 2020.
- ^{xxxv} Interview 5, ARN, 21 May 2018. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a mechanism of the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition created by the Final Agreement to investigate crimes committed in the context of the armed conflict before 1 December 2016, has been at the center of discussion of transitional justice and accountability in Colombia. With regard to former midlevel commanders, see, for example, "JEP llama a versión a diez mandos medios de Farc por caso de secuestro," *El Tiempo*, 28 Sep 2020 <<https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/jep-colombia/jep-llama-a-version-a-mandos-medios-de-farc-por-caso-de-secuestro-540327>>.

- xxxv Former FARC-EP midlevel commander interview 2, 4 Feb 2020.
- xxxvi Former FARC-EP midlevel commander interview 7, 5 Feb 2020. On the terms, such as “the laying down of arms,” used to discuss disarmament during the negotiations, see Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2015) “El Desarme de las FARC: Claves y propuestas para un proceso viable, existoso y transparente” <<http://cdn.ideaspaz.org/media/website/document/5605ffogec154.pdf>>.
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